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In this paper I argue that rumors pose a challenge to effective science communication.
I also argue that it is sometimes reasonable for ordinary laypeople to trust rumors over
the experts. The argument goes like this. There are strong fact-value entanglements in
the sciences. Further, my friends and neighbors may be more likely than the experts to
make value judgments that line up with my own. As such, it can make sense for me to
pay close attention to their testimony. It may even make sense for me to trust testimony
within my peer network—or “rumors”—more than the experts, especially if the experts’
values are especially opaque or suspicious to me. I ground this discussion in the recent
West Africa Ebola outbreak, where rumors posed a substantial challenge to containing
the epidemic.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper I argue that rumors pose a challenge to effective science communication. I also
argue that it is sometimes reasonable for ordinary laypeople to trust rumors over the experts. The
argument goes like this. There are strong fact-value entanglements in the sciences. Further, my
friends and neighbors may be more likely than the experts to make value judgments that line up
with my own. As such, it can make sense for me to pay close attention to their testimony. It may
even make sense for me to trust testimony within my peer network—or “rumors”—more than the
experts, particularly if the experts’ values are especially opaque or suspicious to me.
Throughout this paper, I use “rumor” tomean information passed through informal networks of
communication, usually through very many sources, and which we typically receive frommembers
of our social circles. That is, from friends, neighbors, relatives, fellow pub-goers, etc. Rumors are
essentially “unofficial” (Coady, 2006a, p. 48); that is, there is nothing to underwrite their credibility
(Goldman, 2011, p. 99). This is in stark contrast to the sciences, where checks like peer review
underwrite the credibility of scientific testimony (Longino, 1990). Rumors are a form of peer
testimony, as opposed to expert testimony.
When I use the term “expert” I mean credentialed members of mainstream scientific
communities, excluding members of fringe groups within the sciences. I also use “expert” to
describe envoys of the scientific community, such as medics, who are not “scientists” per say,
but still enjoy credentialed epistemic authority relative to laypeople; and from whom we receive
much of the scientific testimony that we use in our lives (Epstein, 1996, p. 6). This initially
seems to be a strictly social definition of expertise, but underpinning it are more epistemic
and scientific considerations; such as Goldman’s (2011) view that an expert ought to possess “a
substantial body of truths in the target domain” (p. 91) and Longino’s (1990) position that the
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community of mainstream science provides checks that its
members are likely to have substantial bodies of truths about their
targets. Of course, there will be outlier cases, where members of
fringe scientific communities are actually right about a particular
topic (think Galileo), and cases in which those who are right
aren’t scientists at all (think of early AIDS activists in the 1980s
Epstein, 1996). But this is a paper written from the perspective of
ordinary epistemic agents who are not members of the scientific
community, but who still need to make use of science in their
day-to-day lives. They receive information from many different
sources, and for the purposes of discussion we need to demarcate
those sources. Some of the material people get is from official
sources of science communication—the experts—while they get
other information from their peers. Real life is messier and won’t
quite map on to this picture, but it is useful for the sake of
discussion to think about people receiving information in at least
these two ways.
A final piece of clarification before proceeding; which is
what is meant by “reasonableness.” By this term, I don’t
mean that it is strictly rational for people to pay more
attention to peer testimony than to expert testimony. Rather,
I mean that we can understand their reasons for doing so,
and those reasons make sense. It is important to remember
that in the cases we are interested in here, agents are not
engaged in strictly epistemic exercises. They need to make
judgments about what to do for themselves and those they
love, often under extremely difficult circumstances: do I take
my sick sister to the Ebola treatment center? Do I get an
HIV test? Do I vaccinate my child? These situations involve
all-things-considered judgments, and so it is unsurprising
that the appropriateness of those decisions extends beyond
epistemic considerations.
This discussion will take place in the context of the recent
West African Ebola outbreak (roughly 2013–2016). This example
shows clearly the disruptive force of rumors to the effectiveness
of science communication, and in a situation where the stakes
are high; trying to contain a deadly infectious disease. The Ebola
case is also complicated and multi-faceted. There were obviously
substantial challenges to containment that had nothing to do
with rumors or science communication, such as the difficulty of
dealing with an epidemic in a health context where resources
are already over-stretched (Walsh and Johnson, 2018). I am
not arguing that rumors were the only source of containment
problems in the Ebola epidemic. Rather, I use the example of
Ebola to ground the philosophical discussion on rumors, trust
and expertise.
The paper will be strucured as follows. It starts with a
brief introduction of the Ebola case, focussing on the role
of rumors. I then discuss reliance on experts and fact/value
entanglements in the sciences, paying close attention to the
substantial ways in which these are intertwined. I argue that
if you have reason to be suspicious of the values used in
the production and/or communication of science, it might be
reasonable to trust your peers over the experts. I conclude by
responding to some challenges to my position. Notably, that my
peers don’t know anything about science, and that rumors are
inherently untrustworthy.
THE EBOLA CASE
The West African Ebola epidemic ran roughly from 2013 to
2016, covering Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (the so-called
“Ebola Triangle”), with 28,646 confirmed cases and 11,308
confirmed deaths (World Health Organization, 2016; Hofman
and Au, 2017). There had been Ebola outbreaks in Africa before,
but they were smaller; typically occurring in geographically
isolated locations, with small populations, and the disease’s quick
progression and high mortality rate limited its spread (Hofman
and Au, 2017, p. 15–16; Richards, 2016, p. 15). This time it was
much bigger, resulting in a large-scale international intervention;
including from the WHO (World Health Organization), MSF
(Médecins Sans Frontières), various national militaries, and non-
profits. These interventions were met with resistance of varying
degrees in all three countries. The most extreme resistance was in
Guinea, where there were frequent violent attacks on clinics and
ultimately, in 2014, the murder of eight members of a medical
team to prevent them from gaining access to the community
(Fairhead, 2016, p. 9). But there was also resistance in Sierra
Leone and Liberia, including failing to report to clinics when ill,
and hiding the sick frommedical teams, which was a problem for
containment efforts. It is widely accepted that the epidemic would
have ended more quickly if it had not been for this resistance
(Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017, p. 14).
In all three countries there was substantial science
communication; including biomedical information about
the disease, its symptoms, and what to do if you or your loved
ones presented with symptoms (Chandler et al., 2015). However,
there were also rumors in all three locations, and these rumors
drove resistance. Rumors included accusations that medics were
spreading the disease rather than treating it, that the disease
was a plot by governments to take out troublesome marginal
groups, that it was a genetically engineered disease from the
West designed to kill Africans, and that medical teams were
stealing the bodies of the deceased to sell their organs as part
of the international organ market (Fairhead, 2016; Abramowitz
et al., 2017; Desclaux et al., 2017; Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017).
The role of “science journalism” in all of this is complicated.
There was both international and local coverage of the epidemic
(see Zhang and Matingwina, 2016 for discussion of international
coverage). In terms of local science journalism, the picture is
murky; with some more clearly aligned with official sources of
science communication, and others closely resembling rumors.
Newspapers remain an important source of information in West
Africa. Many newspapers are independent and small and rely
on sensational stories to keep sales up. The stories published
during the epidemic are similar to the rumors discussed above
(Halsey, 2016). It makes sense to think of these small independent
newspapers as close to peer testimony, given their proximity
to communities and the publication of content that allied with
what communities were already saying. There are also more
established media outlets in the region, who saw their role as
accurately conveying information about the disease, and they
partnered with national and international health authorities to
do this (Halsey, 2016; Legault, 2017). These latter outlets are thus
closely aligned with official sources of science communication
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(and may be the official sources of science communication itself).
So we see the demarcation between rumors and official sources of
science communication replicated in the media outlets.
That rumors were able to gain traction over official science
communication in many instances (although, not all) suggests
that the rumors were often trusted more than the official
sources of science communication. This is a place where social
epistemology and philosophy of science can help the discussion,
not in diagnosing the phenomenon—that is the realm of the
social sciences—but in understanding whether such behavior can
be reasonable.
EPISTEMIC DIVISIONS OF LABOR,
EXPERTS, AND RUMORS
We rely on divisions of epistemic labor in our normal social
lives. No one of us can individually know everything we need
to know to get by, and so we divide the epistemic tasks between
us (Kitcher, 1990; Goldberg, 2010). For this useful practice to
succeed, we need to be able rely on each other to access this
information as we need it. This is arguably the rationale for the
creation of experts, and it is typically accepted that we (in our
capacity as laypeople) should defer to the experts on the topics
on which they are expert (Kitcher, 2011). Philosophical debate
gets heated when there is expert disagreement or if it isn’t clear
who the experts are Goldman (2011), Coady (2006b), and Jones
(2002), but within this literature it is often presumed that you
should defer to the experts, and the challenge is identifying who
the experts really are.
By contrast, peer testimony is often discredited. Rumors are
taken to be especially poor sources of information—Coady (2006)
describes rumors as a form of “pathological testimony”. Goldman
(2011) takes rumors to be so obviously bad that he uses that as a
premise in an argument against finding information endorsed by
many as more credible than that which is only endorsed by a few
(p. 99). Gelfert (2013) in a rare defense of rumors, argues that it
can make epistemic sense to pay close attention to rumors when
there are no official sources of information available (perhaps you
live under a dictatorial regime in which trustworthy information
is scarce), or if the rumor provides a first encounter with a new
piece of information you wouldn’t otherwise have accessed.
Rumors in the Ebola case are nothing like the instances of
acceptable rumors that Gelfert suggests—that is, when there is no
good information available, or when rumors offer a first point of
contact for a new piece of information. Science communication
meant there was plenty of good official information about Ebola
available, and while rumors may have been a first contact point
about Ebola, they need not have been.
One philosophical response to the Ebola case might be that
those who paid attention to rumors about the disease were
obviously irrational and thus not philosophically interesting.
However, the phenomenon of trusting rumors over the experts is
a much broader than just Ebola. Steinberg (2016) details similar
rumors in South Africa in the mid-2000s when HIV testing
was first being rolled out so that HIV positive people could
access treatment. Steinberg describes an account of one MSF
doctor to illustrate the challenge that rumors posed to effective
implementation of the treatment scheme in South Africa:
The white MSF doctor who spearheaded the programme
introduced himself to the local population by traveling from
village to village personally conducting voluntary HIV tests.
Within weeks, rumors circulated that the doctor was spreading
HIV in his needle. It was said that he was an agent of the old
apartheid regime; that a conspiracy was in progress to infect
so many black people with AIDS that whites would become an
electoral majority. In one village, a hostile crowd confronted the
doctor with this accusation. The tension only abated when he
stood up on a table, drew his own blood in front of the assembled
crowd and explained as best he could the science behind the tests
that would be done on it (Steinberg, 2016, pp. 66-67) (Steinberg,
2016, p. 66–67).
Further, trust in rumors over the experts is broader than cases
of infectious diseases in African countries. Consider the role
of rumors in anti-vaccination movements in North America
and Europe. Again, this is a subject on which there has been
considerable science communication, and yet rumors about a
causal connection between the MMR vaccine and autism persist
(Goldenberg, 2016, p. 553; Kitta and Goldberg, 2017, p. 509).
Paumgarten (2019), in his coverage of recent measles cases
in a Jewish Orthodox community in New York, notes that
information passed through informal community networks was
instramental to the vaccine opposition, ultimately resulting in
this particular outbreak. In Paumgarten’s words:
People often talk about the anti-vaccinationmovement as a social-
media phenomenon, but in the ultra-Orthodox community,
where women are discouraged from using computers and
smartphones, it has apparently spread mostly among mothers
by word of mouth, through phone trees, leaflets, and gatherings:
still viral, but analog. “It’s more about social networks than
social media,” Gellin, of the Sabin Vaccine Institute, said
(Paumgarten, 2019).
Given how wide-spread the issue of trusting rumors over science
communication is, it would be too quick to dismiss it as
obviously irrational. In the next section, I recount the familiar
philosophical view that science is imbued with values. I do this to
provide a values-based justification for trusting the rumors over
the experts.
FACT/VALUE ENTANGLEMENTS
It is now widely accepted that the sciences are thoroughly value-
laden. Values are used to select which scientific projects to
pursue, which methods to use, how to interpret data, and how
to communicate findings to various users of science; amongst
other decision points at which values are invoked (Longino, 1990;
Douglas, 2009; Kitcher, 2011). It is also accepted that many of
these values are social and political, rather than strictly epistemic,
cognitive, or scientific. However, as Matthew Brown points out,
what exactly these values are and how we get the values right is
currently under-theorized in the Philosophy of Science literature
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(Brown, 2018, p. 6). It is well-beyond the scope of this paper to
tackle this question. However, there has been substantial work
showing that there are values in science, and that is all I need for
this argument to proceed.
One example, from very many, that shows values right in
the very heart of scientific work is the role that values played
in the selection of theories of AIDS’s etiology in the early
1980s. At the point when AIDS deaths were first reported, there
were many theories about what was causing AIDS, but the two
strongest contenders were the “microbial account”—that AIDS
was caused by a yet-to-be discoveredmicrobe—and the “immune
overload theory”—that AIDS was a lifestyle disease caused by
factors associated with the 1980s urban American gay scene,
most specifically, drug use and repeated STD exposure. Initially,
the immune overload theory was seen as the most plausible,
because of how exotic the “gay lifestyle” appeared to researchers
(Epstein, 1996, p. 56). This was a scientific judgment of the
relative plausibility of theories based on social/political values,
even if the researchers were unaware that they were doing it.
Much philosophical effort has gone into figuring out what to
do about the value-ladeness of the sciences. Suggestions have
been made that the values should be made more transparent
to the public, that opportunities for public engagement with
the values should be available (Kitcher, 2011; de Melo-Martin
and Intemann, 2018), or that efforts be made to remove values
from the sciences entirely (Bright, 2018 articulating Du Bois’s
position). But it is often unclear how these suggestions would be
implemented in practice.
One problem is that sometimes the facts and values are so
entangled that it is impossible to remove the values without
unraveling the whole scientific enterprise. Elliot (2017) uses
the language of a “tapestry of values” to illustrate how deeply
entwined the facts and the values can be. Sometimes, strategies
for increased value-transparency, or efforts to include the public
in value choices in the sciences, won’t be able to succeed.
This is because the decision points at which value judgments
are invoked are often too technical and too numerous to be
practically explicable to people without relevant expertise. Reiss’s
(2017) work on fact-value entanglements in economics makes
this especially clear. One example he uses to make this point
is that of the development of consumer price indices—that is,
the measure of how much a fixed basket of goods costs over
time. Just one value-based decision point in this metric is how
to weigh the purchasing activities of various households—do we
weigh the standard purchases of the poor more than the rich, or
do we weigh every household the same? These decisions have
practical implications for the uses of the metric, and various
individuals and groups will benefit (or not) depending on these
choices. However, being able to see the value judgements that
are made when choosing between household weightings requires
economic expertise, thus making it difficult, if not impossible,
to explain to the public. And there are many other such value-
laden technical decision points in the development of just this
metric. Cases like this indicate that calls from philosophers to
make the values more transparent or to have more value-based
public-participation are not always feasible. Of course, sometimes
value transparency will be easy—perhaps I am a social scientist
and a card carrying member of the Labor Party (in the UK), I
could just declare my political affiliation and that would go some
way to making the values transparent.
When I (as a lay member of the public) am presented with
the messy mass of facts and values, I may not be able to unravel
the values from the facts. Further, as indicated above, I have
good reason to believe that the whole process of producing the
sciences is imbued with these values. This is fine if I believe the
values involved are neutral, or that they are close to my own,
or if I suspect that they are values that I would endorse, but
what about situations in which I am suspicious of the values?
In situations like this, value judgments made by my peers may
be more trustworthy to me than those made by the scientists, and
as such, I may trust their testimony more.
Kitcher (2011) hints at something like this in Science in
Democratic Society, when he argues that one of the key ways that
members of the public become disillusioned with the sciences
is when there are “opaque value judgments” at work in the
production of science (p. 155). He goes further to explain that he
means cases in which the value judgments aren’t transparent to
the public (i.e., they are “opaque”), and where the public suspect
that the values run counter to those that would have been chosen
by a democratic process. His solution is to have more democratic
involvement in science. I think Kitcher’s assessment of opaque
value judgements is correct, but I diverge with him in two ways.
First, I think that opaque value judgments are a problem because
individuals suspect the values run counter to their own values, not
necessarily those that would be selected via a democratic process.
Second, I think that democratic solutions to the problem of
opaque value judgments are often unavailable, because the value-
based decision points are technical and numerous (as discussed
in Reiss’s example from economics). Instead, I think that the
problem of opaque value judgments means that it canmake sense
for me to trust my neighbors more than the experts, because
my neighbor’s values are clear to me and are likely to align to
my own.
An obvious initial objection to my position is that this is a
very complicated way to go and that ordinary laypeople are not
aware of intricate intertwining between facts and values that Reiss
and Kitcher describe. However, although ordinary members of
the public might not be able to articulate this problem the way
that the philosophers do, they are aware that something like
this is afoot. When someone who is suspicious of a mainstream
climate scientist makes a comment like “of course he would
say that, he is a Birkenstock-wearing, granola-eating hippy,”
they are articulating a suspicion about values to question a
scientific claim.
Further, recent psychological work in Cultural Cognition
argues that individuals do in fact trust experts whose values more
closely align with their own. A classic example of this is that one’s
political affiliation is typically closely aligned with one’s views on
climate science (Kahan, 2016). Social epistemologists have paid
attention to this development in psychological research, but have
argued that this is a problem in need of remedy. McKenna (2019)
argues that we should recognize this as potential source of bias in
our reasoning-processes and make appropriate efforts to mitigate
it. Ballantyne (2019) argues that this aspect of our psychology
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is likely to make us poor judges of who to trust in cases of
expert disagreement (p. 237). However, once we recognize how
thoroughly value-laden the sciences are, trusting those whose
values we share seems like a reasonable thing to do.
At this point we should pay closer attention to the type of
testimony we receive from our peer network vs. the type of
testimonywe receive from experts, because this will help to clarify




The debate about whether scientists can deliver value free
testimony is well-established, at least since Rudner (1953)
introduced the problem of inductive risk. This issue has been
further developed to take account of scientists acting as policy
advisors (Steele, 2012). But this is further complicated once we
acknowledge how baked into the scientific process values can
be—even if one can find a value neutral way of articulating
the products of science, the values will be there in the way
that the science has been produced. The picture is even more
complicated when we look at the way that ordinary laypersons
receive testimony about science; as opposed to policy makers,
science journalists, or other kinds of elites.
Often the information that is conveyed to ordinary members
of the public reflects not just the values that we typically find
in the sciences, but also various value based policy decisions
that have already been made and are then conveyed as all-things
considered judgments about what one ought to do. One example
of this is the medical advice that individuals receive when they
test HIV positive; which is that they should immediately start
anti-retroviral therapy (ARVs). This reflects a broader policy
commitment to “treatment as prevention,” and is a very recent
development in HIV/AIDS treatment protocols. Previously,
there were extensive medical debates about how low one’s CD4
count1 should be before beginning treatment. Importantly, when
someone receives the piece of information that they are HIV
positive and thus ought to go on treatment immediately, what
they are receiving is heavily value-laden (both from the sciences
and the health policy makers) and may run counter to the
individual’s own value-judgments (Seckinelgin, 2020). Perhaps
the individual would rather delay starting treatment—being on
ARVs can be unpleasant, it can be expensive depending on where
one lives, and it may result in needing to go on more severe
regimens sooner than if initial treatment had been delayed. This
problem is not unique to HIV/AIDS, but occurs in many spheres
in which policy decisions underpin science communication, such
as in clinical guidelines.
The point of this sub-section is that often scientific
information is given to us (in our capacity as laypeople) in the
form of all-things-considered judgments about what to do, even
if the philosophical ideal may be that we receive the “facts”
1That is, the measure of a specific white blood cell that fights infection. When
an HIV positive person’s CD4 count is lower than 200 they are diagnosed as
having AIDS.
and make our own value-laden all-things-considered judgments
about what to do with that information.
Testimony From Peers
Earlier in this paper, I discussed epistemic divisions of labor
and how this gives rise to experts. However, it is also the case
that we have something like epistemic divisions of labor within
our peer networks. My neighbors and friends may have already
encountered situations that I am only just encountering for the
first time. They may have done their homework on that issue,
and successfully navigated their way through a difficult course
of action. Importantly, they may have done this from a social
position that is very much like my own, with values like my own
and which I know are like my own.
One example of this is pregnancy and place of birth. There
is significant debate over what the evidence shows about the
safety of giving birth outside of an obstetric unit. McClimans
(2017) and de Melo-Martin and Intemann (2012) argue that
interpretations of the evidence are value-dependent. Issues such
as acceptable levels of risk, and risk to the mother versus risk
to fetus are value-laden. In this context, if I were pregnant and
making decisions about where I plan to give birth, I might talk
to my friends with children about where they gave birth, why
they made those decisions, and what those experiences were
like. This is a kind of epistemic division of labor, but when I
consult my friends for advice on place of birth, I am knowingly
receiving all-things considered judgments about what to do in
my situation.
Thinking more carefully about the testimony one gets from
experts and the testimony one gets from peers should further
strengthen the core argument of this paper: trusting testimony
I receive from my friends and peers over that of experts can
sometimes be a sensible strategy. It is often the case that both
sets of testimony are value-laden. However, at least I know that
my friends’ values reflect my own. In the following sections I
will consider two objections to my view: (1) that rumors are




A concern about trusting rumors is their epistemic status—how
likely are they to be true? This is a point of some controversy.
There is some experimental evidence that the sheer number of
individuals involved in rumor networks diminish their accuracy;
each new agent in the network introduces a point at which
errors can be made and incorrect information is shared (Allport
and Postman, 1947 cited in Coady, 2006a, p. 50). Think of
the children’s game “Broken Telephones”, in which children
transmit messages down a row and see whether the message
at the end of the line is the same as the one at the start. It
almost never is. As such, you really shouldn’t ever trust the
rumors because there are inherently extremely poor sources
of information.
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There are also arguments to the contrary. Notably, some
argue that real-world rumors (as opposed to their experimental
counterparts mentioned above) are likely to be accurate, because
“plausibility” is a selection pressure on whether they are
transmitted (Coady, 2006a, p. 45–47). Think of a “Marketplace
of Ideas,” but for rumors—only the plausible rumors get passed
on. Further, in real-world conditions, individuals may have
opportunities to judge the credibility of the sources from whom
they receive information (Coady, 2006a, p. 50).
However, debating whether or not rumors are good sources
of literally true information is beside the point—how much of
the testimony in our social lives is about conveying literally
true information to our peers? This links to broader issues
in epistemology about the status of testimony, in which
“[d]iscussion [in epistemology] is restricted to cases in which
the speaker’s utterance is meant literally, rather than rhetorically,
playfully, figuratively, fictionally, or ironically” (Adler, 2017).
As Adler (2017), points out, this is a move made for “brevity,”
rather than reflecting how testimony actually works. Most of our
actual testimony is looser than the accurate conveyance of true
information, but it does other kinds of work.
Consider Davis’s (2017) recent popular book Post-Truth: Why
we have reached peak bullshit and what we can do about it.
In it, he argues that there are large swathes of testimony that
are not literally true, and that we know are not literally true,
but which are useful at conveying other sorts of information.
To borrow an example from Davis (2017), when you go to a
dinner party and the host burns the tart for dessert, you would
never agree with the host that it is burnt. Instead you say that
it is “delicious” and “perfect.” Everyone knows that this isn’t
true. But you are conveying to everyone at the party that you
are polite, and know how to behave at dinner parties (Davis,
2017, p. 99). Something similar happens in untrue testimony
at the political level. In another example from Davis (2017),
when Donald Trump makes speeches in which he states that
unemployment is currently at 35–40%, this number is so wildly
out of step with the actual figures, that it shouldn’t be taken as
a piece of testimony attempting to convey literal truth. Instead
it is meant to convey sympathy for the working classes, and the
exaggeration helps to do that (Davis, 2017, p. 32).
Rumors have this same quality. Even if they aren’t literally
true, story-telling and exaggeration help to more clearly express
the central messages: “stay away from the medics” or “don’t
vaccinate your children.” Perhaps the rumor of medics body
snatching people in Guinea to sell their organs on the black
market should not be understood as literally true, but rather as
using a shocking story to make sure that the message of avoiding
the medics sticks, and avoiding the medics can be a sensible thing
to do given the infectiousness of the disease.
To summarize this section, rumors may or may not be good
at conveying literally true information about the world—there
are arguments on both sides of this debate. However, rumors,
like much of our ordinary testimony, can do other work such as
emphasising the all-things-considered judgment about what you
ought to do.
BUT MY NEIGHBORS KNOW NOTHING
ABOUT SCIENCE
At this point, you might accept both that facts and values are
often deeply entangled in the sciences, and that your neighbors’
value judgments might be more likely to align with your own
than those of scientists (or, at least, that scientists’ values may
be opaque). However, you might resist the conclusion that this
can give you reason to trust rumors over more official sources
of science communication. After all, there are two parts to
the fact/value entanglement, and while my neighbors might be
better at the values bit, they know nothing about the facts. How
troubling this is to you, will depend on who you are as an agent,
and what your aims and priorities are.
Presumably, it is not news to you that your neighbor is not
a scientific expert. When you decide to trust their testimony
over that of scientists, part of that decision may involve being
willing to take an epistemic hit in order to make sure that your
values are preserved. Consider the Jehovah’s Witness, who is
fully aware of the scientific facts around blood transfusions, but
on value grounds refuses to allow their child to receive one.
Similarly, if I am in the midst an Ebola outbreak, and I know that
the information I am receiving from official sources of science
communication is a messy tangle of facts and values, I may
prioritize the values (if they are sufficiently important to me).
There are anthropological reports from the Ebola case, and from
West Africa more generally, that suggest that the values were very
important in this case.
To see the importance of values in the Ebola case, consider just
one issue that was both the subject of rumor and the site of severe
resistance; the treatment of the bodies. Rumors were that families
were unable to receive the bodies of their loved ones because they
were stolen for the international organ markets (Fairhead, 2016,
p. 10). Not being able to properly bury loved ones was a serious
problem on value grounds; linked to beliefs about the fate of the
deceased if they did not have a proper burial, and also to beliefs
about what would happen to the community if they did not
do this—failed crops would be one such consequence (Wiredu,
2010; Fairhead, 2016, p. 13). Note that there were good fact-based
grounds for not returning the bodies—bodies remain extremely
infectious for 3 days after death and the large funerals typical
in the region were sites of infection for many (Fairhead, 2016,
p. 8). Burials were a substantial point of resistance. Even Sierra
Leone, which is taken to be amenable to Ebola interventions,
had cases of bodies being buried in secret without notifying
the official authorities of an Ebola death, or washing the body
before the official burial teams arrived (Wilkinson and Fairhead,
2017, p. 23). In more extreme cases, there were reports of
ambulances and medical teams being stoned in their efforts to
collect bodies for burial (Wilkinson and Fairhead, 2017, p. 21).
In one early case in Guinea, a family refused to give contact
information to authorities, which was essential to establishing
a chain of transmission, until appropriate burial arrangements
had been made (Fairhead, 2016, p. 15). Given how important
the values around burials are in West Africa, it is plausible that
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value- considerations would have trumped fact-considerations,
regardless of the source of testimony.
However, that one may be taking values very seriously in an
all-things-considered judgment about what to do, and perhaps
prioritizing the values, doesn’t mean that individuals discard the
facts entirely, at least not always. The example of the Jehovah’s
Witness is meant only to show that sometimes people do
prioritize values. And perhaps some in the Ebola crisis prioritized
values too—perhaps some individuals received true official
information about the risks of burial, which they accepted, and
decided that the value of a traditional funeral service was more
important to them. However, in other cases we see individuals
grappling with the difficulty of doing both simultaneously.
One example of this is a recent study of decisions to vaccine
or not amongst parents who are vaccine-hesitant (Peretti-Watel
et al., 2019). This study shows both the reliancemothers (mothers
were found to be the key decision makers on vaccination) have
on their peer networks for information, and their concerns about
getting the answer “right”. They weren’t throwing facts to the
wind in order to prioritize values. On the reliance on peers, the
study reports:
But mothers did not decide alone: they all took advice from
other women, including female relatives (mothers, sisters), female
friends and neighbors, as well as mothers of their children’s
schoolmates. Other key information sources included physicians
and the Internet (p. 1198).
Despite being reliant on peer networks for information, mothers
were still worried about getting the answer “right.” This quote
from a mother who did vaccinate her child, but was still
concerned about the decision after the fact makes this concern
clear: “I think I made the right decision...I hope I’m not wrong”
(p. 1,197). She is worried about having made the right factual call,
not the right value call.
Importantly, there are likely to be a range of actors with
different fact/value priorities and different views about how
to balance these. Some will accept official sources of science
communication and act accordingly. Some will receive official
science communication, accept its factual claims, but choose to
act differently on value grounds. But there will also be others who
are engaged in a more complicated balancing act between the
facts and values—such as the mother who consults her neighbors
about whether to vaccinate her child, but still worries about
whether she has got it “right” even after the fact.
A final note for those who are squeamish about the thought
of trusting your neighbor over that of the experts. That is, the
account I offer here is not intended to be prescriptive. Rather,
this is intended as a reasonable reconstruction of events. In
John’s (2011). Expert Testimony and Epistemological Free-Riding:
The MMR Controversy, he argues that in certain cases, parents
failing to vaccinate their children should be considered a form
of epistemic free-riding. That is, if a parent is in a situation
where they can’t tell if vaccines are harmful or not, it would be
individually rational for them not to vaccinate their children. The
idea is that they would protect their child from any risk of harm,
while still benefitting from the herd immunity of everyone else
who has taken on the risk and vaccinated their children. John
is not arguing that it is a good thing to avoid vaccination, he
just provides an account of events that takes the agents seriously,
and doesn’t fall back on dismissing them as obviously irrational.
Similarly, I am not arguing that it is a good idea to secretly bury
your family members after an Ebola death, I am just providing an
account that takes agents seriously as epistemic actors.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that rumors pose a challenge to
effective science communication. This is especially clear in the
case of the recent West African Ebola outbreak, where rumors
drove resistance against interventions, and stalled containment.
There is also evidence that this is a more wide-spread
phenomenon, as can be seen in cases of rumors about AIDS in
South Africa and vaccines in ultra-orthodox Jewish communities
in New York. Further, I have argued that sometimes trusting
rumors over expert testimony makes sense. The production and
communication of science is heavily value-laden, and the values
cannot be easily disentangled from the facts to check that they
are acceptable. This is particularly troublesome when there are
reasons to be suspicious of the values. My neighbor’s values may
be more transparent and trustworthy to me than the experts’,
making trust in rumors reasonable, especially in situations the
values really matter, like they did in the Ebola outbreak. Rumors
might not be excellent sources of literally true information about
the world, but much of our ordinary testimony is similarly not
literally true, but should be understood as doing other forms of
communicative work.
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